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THE REASONABLE E X P E C T A T I O N OF AN INSURED
IS A QUESTION OF F A C T W H I C H C A N N O T BE
RESOLVED BY AN A P P E L L A T E C O U R T ON R E V I E W OF
THE GRANT OF A M O T I O N FOR SUMMARY J U D G M E N T
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summary judgment.

The court below ruled, as a matter of law,

that the express words of the insurance policy in question had
to control the interpretation of the parties* agreement.

This

Court, .however, held that contract terms which are "against the
reasonable expectations of the parties may be found void in the
appropriate circumstances."

Slip. Op. at 5.

This Court

further acknowledged that to determine the reasonable
expectations of the insured one must examine "extrinsic matters
such as the intent of the parties, the purpose sought to be
accomplished, the subject matter of the contract, and
circumstances surrounding the issuance of the policy."

Slip.

Op. at 6.
It has been uniformly acknowledged that where
interpretation of a written instrument turns
on the acceptance of extrinsic evidence, the
process of weighing such evidence should be
for the trier of fact.
Hausam v. Wodrich, 574 P.2d 805, 809 (Alas. 1978).

As noted in

the Restatement of Contracts 2d, § 212 comment e (1981), "if
the issue depends on evidence outside the writing, and the
possible inferences are conflicting, the choice is for the
trier of fact."
In the instant case, Mr. Wagner purchased
"underinsurance" coverage, not just uninsured motorist coverage,
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which he was told could be used as a "supplement to [an
underinsured's] bodily injury insurance. . . . "

Depo. of

Cal Coleman at p. 15. Mrs. Wagner has alleged that she and her
husband had a reasonable expectation that such coverage would
protect them if one of them was injured by the negligence of an
underinsured driver.

The defendant moved for summary judgment

on the grounds that Utah didn't recognize the reasonable
expectations doctrine and the trial court agreed.

It is

inappropriate for this Court to acknowledge, on the one hand,
that Utah does recognize the doctrine, and then on the other to
affirm the Court as though it had made a factual ruling on that
issue, which it did not.
Where a trial court has based its ruling on
a misunderstanding of the law, or might have
done so, and a correct application would
have produced a different result, the party
adversely affected is entitled to have the
matter readjudicated under correct principle
of law.
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 420-21
(Utah 1983) .
It is important to remember that this case was decided
while in its infancy.

Only one deposition was taken before

defendant sought judgment on the sole basis that under the
terms of the policy "uninsured motorist coverage is excluded by
the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle which does not
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include an automobile owned by or furnished or available for
the regular use of an insured or any family member."
Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment at p. 1.

This

Court, having found that the reasonable expectations of the
insured can operate to preclude enforcement of the express
terms of the policy and that extrinsic evidence is required to
resolve this question, should not preclude the development and
presentation of such extrinsic evidence to the factfinder by
affirming a grant of summary judgment on a ground which was not
argued to the trial court.

To do so would be to deny the

plaintiff the right to present her evidence on an issue of fact
which has not heretofore been decided by the trier of fact and
to substitute the judgment of this Court for that of the trier
of fact on a factual issue.
The Court treated this appeal as though the case had
been fully resolved on the basis of stipulated facts.
not correct.

This is

While the parties did not dispute the evidence in

the record, a material dispute certainly existed regarding the
ultimate fact, Mr. Wagner's reasonable expectations.

The

defendant offered no evidence on this question, it merely
asserted that it was immaterial because the express language of
the contract was controlling as a matter of law.

Having

determined that Mr. Wagner's reasonable expectations are
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material to the resolution of this case, this Court should
remand to the District Court for presentation of evidence on
this question to the factfinder.
In moving for summary judgment, the defendant did not
assert that there was no dispute concerning Mr. Wagner's
reasonable expectations and did not purport to even base its
motion on the deposition testimony of Mr. Coleman.

See

Defendant's Motion for Declaratory Judgment at p. 2.

This

testimony was presented to the lower court in support of
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

While this Court is

clearly of the opinion that plaintiffs motion was properly
denied, that should not equate to a holding that defendant's
motion was properly granted.

The unresolved issue of fact,

which had not been developed or ruled upon in the court below,
was whether Mr. Wagner had a reasonable expectation of coverage
under the circumstances of the case.
The Court's error in reviewing this matter was its
examination of the record to determine if plaintiff had proven
her case as of the date of the defendant's motion was heard.
The plaintiff has no such burden in opposing a motion for
summary judgment, and certainly not when the motion was
predicated on an issue of lawe
While the Court indicated that it has made a "thorough

-5-

review of the record" and found the plaintiff's evidence
wanting in establishing her case, it must be remembered that
this is not the Court's function in reviewing the grant of a
motion for summary judgment.

It is axiomatic that in reviewing

the grant of a motion for summary judgment all doubts,
uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of fact must be
construed in the light most favorable to the party resisting
the motion.

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright &

Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).

It is the moving

party's burden to marshal all the evidence and he is only
entitled to judgment "where [he] makes a showing which
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to
the losing party,,"

FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co.,

594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (1979).

Here, the moving party offered no

evidence of Mr. Wagner's expectation or its reasonableness, nor
did the court below make any factual finding on the question.
The court below ruled that the doctrine of reasonable
expectation was not the law in Utah.

This Court disagreed, but

failed to recognize that the trial court had not addressed the
fact issue, which it deemed to be immaterial.

The effect of

this Court's ruling, upon grounds differing from those advanced
in the trial court, is to preclude plaintiff from the
opportunity of developing or presenting her evidence to the
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factfinder for determination.

As our Supreme Court stated in

Reliable Furniture Co, v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins, Underwriters,
Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965),
It is . . .to safeguard the right of access
to the courts for the enforcement of rights
and the remedy of wrongs by a trial, and by
a jury if desired, that it is of such
importance that the court should take care
to see that the party adversely affected has
a fair opportunity to present his
contentions against precipitate action which
will deprive him of that privilege. His
contentions as to facts should be considered
in the light most favorable to him, and only
if it clearly appears that he could not
establish a right to recovery under the law
should such action [entry of summary
judgment] be taken; and any doubts which
exist should be resolved in favor of
affording him the privilege of a trial.
398 Utah 2d 685.
As noted by Justice Durham in State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Utah 1987)
(Durham, J., dissenting), if the issue of an insured's
reasonable expectations is squarely put before the trial court,
judgment for the insurer cannot be sustained unless that issue
has been the subject of factual findings by the court.
Such findings have not been made in this case.

This

Court incorrectly treated this action as though the plaintiff
was appealing from an adverse ruling on the basis of stipulated
facts.

This is incorrect.

The basic fact about which the
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parties have not agree'd, and upon which plaintiff has not
received a determination by the trier of fact, is Mr. Wagner's
reasonable expectation of coverage.

This Court should not

substitute its judgment on this question for that of the
factfinder on the basis of evidence contained in a truncated
record.
CONCLUSION
The reasonable expectations of an insured presents a
factual issue which must be presented to the factfinder for
resolution on the basis of extrinsic evidence and reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom.
this action.

This has never occurred in

Plaintiff is entitled to develop her evidence and

present it to the trial court even if this Court is of the
opinion that it would resolve that question against her on the
basis of what it presently knows of the evidence.

Weighing the

evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence is not a
function of an appellate court.

This is the province of the

trial court and it has yet to occur in this case.

Accordingly,

the matter should be remanded for resolution of the factual
issue presented on the basis of the standards outlined in the
Court's prior opinion.
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